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Perception and Reality in Congressional
Earmarks
Michael H. Crespin, Charles J. Finocchiaro, and Emily O. Wanless
Abstract
Earmarks added to appropriations bills have generated a considerable amount of attention
from the media, politicians, and fiscal watchdog groups. Taken as a whole, three “truths” about
earmarks are frequently discussed: 1) earmarks are the reason for large budget deficits, 2) using
omnibus legislation instead of regular order leads to more earmarks, and 3) “airdropped” earmarks
added at the conference stage compound the problem of pork. In this paper, we examine these
“truths” and find the conventional wisdom does not stand up to empirical tests. Finally, we show
how Congress easily worked around new rules concerning the addition of earmarks at the confer-
ence stage.
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 From the $223 million to build a “Bridge to Nowhere” to the $3 million 
spent on studying bear DNA, pork barrel projects generate quite a bit of attention.  
In the recently enacted $787 billion stimulus legislation, policymakers clashed 
over the inclusion of earmarks.  Although the Washington Post and President 
Obama, among others, declared the bill free of “traditional” earmarks—funding 
for a project inserted by a lawmaker bypassing the normal budgeting process—
others, most notably congressional Republicans, pointed toward what they viewed 
as billions of dollars in wasteful spending in the legislation.1  The issue of pork 
barrel spending and earmarks also emerged as a contentious issue during the 2008 
presidential campaign.  Newspapers frequently run stories with headlines like 
“Pork Reform Drowned in Gravy” or “Bailout Dish has a Heaping Side of Pork,” 
and several watchdog groups exist almost exclusively to monitor and advocate the 
limitation of wasteful government spending.2  Negative publicity arising from 
recent lobbying scandals, in tandem with the work of outside groups and a small 
band of congressional reformers, have caused something of a backlash from the 
public and have prompted Congress to look into reforms of the process by which 
members add earmarks to appropriations bills.  
According to Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW), a fiscal 
watchdog group whose mission is to “eliminate waste, mismanagement, and 
inefficiency in the federal government,” appropriators have tacked more than 
100,849 earmarks worth more than $290 billion onto spending legislation since 
1991.3  In 2005, the number of earmarks included in appropriations bills peaked at 
a record 13,492 projects carrying a price tag exceeding $27.3 billion.  For the 
2006 budget, Congress reduced the number of projects to 9,963 but increased the 
dollar amount to $29 billion.  In 2007, just two of the regular appropriations bills 
were passed but legislators still managed to include over 2,500 projects worth 
$13.2 billion.  For fiscal year (FY) 2008, Congress appropriated just over $17.2 
billion dollars for earmarked projects.  The most recent appropriations cycle 
marks a continuation of legislators’ earmarking ways—the legislation contains 
more than 10,160 earmarks worth about $19.6 billion.  In addition, according to 
Congressional Quarterly, more than 100 House members requested earmarks in 
the spending bill for clients of the PMA group, a lobbying firm currently under 
investigation by the FBI. 4  The increasing trend in earmarks, coupled with other 
                                                 
1 Dan Eggen and Ellen Nakashima, “Despite Pledges, Package Has Some Pork,” Washington Post, 
13 February, 2009; “See No Earmarks,” Wall Street Journal, 5 March, 2009. 
2 Brian Riedl, “Pork Reform Drowned in Gravy,” The Washington Times, 2 December, 2007; Juan 
Gonzalez, “Bailout Dish has a Heaping Side of Pork,” New York Daily News, 3 October, 2008. 
3 CAGW’s mission statement and earmark data are available at the following URLs, respectively: 
http://www.cagw.org/site/PageServer?pagename=about_Mission_History and http://www.cagw. 
org/site/PageServer?pagename=reports_porkbarrelreport#trends (accessed October 28, 2008). 
4 Jonathan Allen, “House to Vote on Earmark Ethics Probe as PMA Clients Show up in Omnibus,” 
CQ Politics, 24 February, 2009. 
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scandals involving lobbyists and elected officials, has led to a renewed campaign 
against earmarks by the media, groups like CAGW and Taxpayers for Common 
Sense, and Republican politicians like Arizona’s Jeff Flake and John McCain as 
well as Senators Jim DeMint (SC) and Tom Coburn (OK).   
In this article, we consider three common assertions that arise in the public 
discourse relating to pork.  Our aim is not to stake out a pro or con position on 
pork in general, but rather to bring to bear recent data and in the process 
demonstrate some fallacies in the perceptions of policymakers and journalists.  
First, we look at the scope of earmarking within the broader context of federal 
spending.  Next, we examine the degree to which omnibus legislation contributes 
to the rise in pork barrel spending that has occurred over roughly the past decade.  
Third, we consider the practice of “airdropping” projects in conference 
committees, which has recently come to light as one of the more controversial 
aspects of earmarking.  Additionally, we use a short case study of the fiscal year 
2008 defense appropriations bill to demonstrate how the recent reforms instituted 
by Congress did little to address the supposed problems with adding pork-barrel 
projects at the conference stage of the appropriations process. 
 
Pork Barrel Spending and the Deficit 
 
An oft-heard criticism of earmarks is that their procurement elicits a tendency to 
“damn the deficit, and pile on the pork.”5  Headlines such as this perpetuate the 
notion that pork projects attached to appropriations bills are a major contributor, if 
not the driving force, behind budget deficits and the burgeoning national debt.  
The media dutifully record the requests made by legislators, indicating that when 
tallied, the demand for pork has led to wasteful spending at the expense of 
pressing national issues.6  Negative perceptions of pork are only exacerbated by 
reporting of the most obscure and seemingly profligate projects. 
Of course, one difficulty with studying pork is trying to differentiate 
between wasteful spending and important projects, and it is not our intention or 
purpose to differentiate between efficient and inefficient government spending.  
To help solve the problem of identifying what is and what is not a pork project, 
we depend on earmark data from CAGW.  Since 1991, CAGW has released an 
annual report summarizing the pork-barrel projects contained in the assorted 
appropriations bills that fund the various activities of the federal government.  
According to CAGW’s definition, “a ‘pork’ project is a line-item in an 
appropriations bill that designates tax dollars for a specific purpose in 
circumvention of established budgetary procedures.”  In order to be included in 
the annual report, a project must meet at least two of the following criteria: 
                                                 
5 Jennifer Drew, “Damn the Deficit, and Pile on the Pork,” Business Week, 9 May, 2005. 
6 Carl Hulse, “Congress Continues Its Pursuit of Earmarks,” New York Times, 20 December, 2007. 




requested by only one chamber of Congress, not specifically authorized, not 
competitively awarded, not requested by the president, greatly exceed the 
president’s budget request or the previous year’s funding, not the subject of 
congressional hearings, or serve only a local or special interest.  CAGW notes that 
theirs is not a comprehensive list of earmarks, in that earmarks, which designate 
funds for a specific beneficiary or locality, may or may not be included via 
established budgetary procedures.7  However, the media and politicians frequently 
rely on these data when discussing the problems with earmarks so it is only 
reasonable to use these data to test their assertions.       
Unsurprisingly, members of Congress frequently state that any dollar 
spent in their district is vital for their constituents and everything else is just 
wasting taxpayer dollars.  The media and watchdog groups frequently report 
specific and imprudent uses of earmarks by individual legislators, providing 
ammunition for claims of flagrant abuse and attention given to particularized 
constituencies.  News articles and editorials constantly emphasize earmarks like 
one by Rep. David Hobson (R–OH) included in the FY2008 omnibus package.  
His earmark designated $800,000 for a Speedway SuperAmerica gas station, 
convenience store, and pizza parlor.  When asked to justify the earmark, he 
described it as a “‘vitally important’ need in the community ‘with hundreds of 
college students and no pizza delivery or nearby fast food options.’”8  In another 
example, Sen. Judd Gregg (R–NH) defended the $18 million he secured for the 
Dartmouth Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection by calling the 
project “an important component in our overall counterterrorism preparedness.”9   
Another approach frequently adopted by critics of earmarks is to point out 
instances in which legislators seem to not only approve of pork, but also boast of 
their ability to obtain particularistic spending.  A member of Congress frequently 
cited as a brazen abuser of earmarks is Rep. John Murtha (D–PA), chair of the 
Defense Appropriations subcommittee, requestor of $162 million in earmarks in 
2007 alone, and “Pork King” according to editorial writers.  The depiction of Mr. 
Murtha’s actions is anything but flattering: while “procuring eye-popping chunks 
of pork…he exudes pride, not embarrassment, for delivering hundreds of millions 
of dollars in largesse to district beneficiaries.  They, in turn, requite with hundreds 
of thousands of dollars in campaign donations.”10   
                                                 
7 Congressional scholarship has defined pork—or distributive politics—in a variety of ways.  For 
instance, Stein and Bickers (1995) look at programmatic policies that distribute federal funds, 
while Lee (2000) examines formulas setting the state-by-state allocation of federal highway funds. 
8 Michael Franc, “An End to Earmarks? It is Possible,” The Weekly Standard, 8 January, 2008. 
9 Carl Hulse, “Spending Bill Is Approved, With Its Storehouse of Pork,” New York Times, 14 
February, 2003. 
10 “The Pork King Keeps His Crown,” New York Times, 14 January, 2008. 
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Finally, as evidenced by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008, more commonly known as the Wall Street bailout bill, earmarks are 
perceived by the media as deal breakers in the legislative process.  With the 
bailout, the media credits the switch of fifty-eight representatives to favoring the 
second version of the bill to the addition of “sweeteners designed to increase 
support among Republicans.”11 Similarly, passage of the bill in the Senate was 
accredited to the inclusion of such constituent-specific tax breaks as exemptions 
for the production of children’s wooden arrows and write-offs for NASCAR track 
owners.12 Including such provision gives members incentives to support a bill 
they might not otherwise agree with. 
In sum, portrayals of earmarks tend to be characterized by a general 
negativity toward them and a focus on the sensational cases, which in turn fuels 
the perception of a negative relationship between earmarks and fiscal restraint.  
But to what extent are potentially unjustified projects—or, for that matter, 
earmarks as a whole—at the root of U.S. budgetary woes?  When we look at the 
total amount of earmarks in comparison to the federal budget and the annual 
deficit, we see that earmarks account for very little of total spending.  Figure 1 
plots the amount of pork (as defined by CAGW) along with federal outlays and 
the size of the deficit from 1991-2008.  In addition, we present spending on 
Defense as well as Medicare and Social Security.  If we compare the size of the 
budget with the amount of pork, the total budget clearly trumps pork dollars by 
several orders of magnitude since we can measure total outlays in trillions of 
dollars and pork spending has yet to exceed $30 billion.  The figure also 
demonstrates that the size of the deficit and the amount of pork in a given year are 
not directly related to one another.  In fact, the correlation between pork and the 
size of the deficit is -0.09.  Of course, this is not to say that earmarks are not 
contributing to the size of the deficit, only that any contribution is minimal.   
Another way to think about earmarks is to consider their portion of federal 
spending in relation to particular programs and outlays.  For 2008, discretionary 
spending (set annually by Congress) was approximately $1.1 trillion, while 
entitlement spending (required by law) was more than $1.5 trillion.  Spending on 
interest alone surpassed $240 billion, which in tandem with discretionary and 




                                                 
11 Sean Lengell and S.A. Miller, “Bush Signs Wall Street Bailout,” The Washington Times, 4 
October, 2008. 
12 “Top 10 Tax Sweeteners in the Bailout Bill,” Taxpayers for Common Sense, http://www. 
taxpayer.net/resources.php?category=&type=Project&proj_id=1429&action=Headlines%20By%2
0TCS (accessed February 24, 2009). 
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 When we look at specific programs, we find that funding Social Security 
required $610 billion and means-tested entitlements (including programs such as 
Medicaid) more than $390 billion.  Over time, we see that spending for Defense 
and Medicare and Social Security is not only significantly greater than the amount 
of pork dollars but that it is also increasing at a greater rate.  From the figure, it 
appears that spending on these two areas began to rise more quickly after FY2000 
while pork spending remained comparatively even.  Even Foreign Aid, which in 
comparison is just a drop in the bucket at around $35 billion, far exceeded the 
total spending due to earmarks of $17.2 billion in 2008.13  Thus, to pin 
overspending and rising budget deficits on pork barrel spending is a severe 
overstatement since the latter made up about one-half of one percent of the $2.9 
trillion spent by the federal government in the 2008 fiscal year and has never been 
more than 1.1 percent of total outlays.  These observations are reinforced by the 
work of Lee (2005), who tracked earmarking in appropriations with total 
government outlays from 1992-2003 and found that expenditures for programs 
most likely to be secured through pork (transportation, water projects, community 
                                                 
13 All federal budget data are from U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2008). 
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and regional development) have declined as a proportion of GDP.  While 
increasing levels of pork may be symptomatic of a larger government spending 




Members of Congress and pundits alike often bemoan omnibus appropriations 
legislation, calling these combined spending packages “Christmas tree bills” 
because they include something for everyone.14  Accounts often imply that 
omnibus bills foster an environment that promotes unbridled earmarking because 
the catch-all structure allows legislators to attach earmarks without having to 
worry about public or legislative scrutiny.  Writing for the Washington Times, 
Donald Lambro described the omnibus as a “catchall spending package that has 
been used to hide tens of billions of dollars in wasteful pork, mysteriously tucked 
into its opaque provisions.”15  David Williams, vice president of policy for 
CAGW, condemned the 2008 measure, calling it “totally fiscally irresponsible to 
lump everything together in one spending bill and put it to a vote less than 24 
hours later.”16 
Political scientists have also documented the rise in the use of omnibus 
legislation, addressing its proposed advantages and disadvantages.  Scholars 
identified a trend towards omnibus legislating since the 1950s (Baumgartner et al. 
1997; Howell et al. 2000; Mayhew 1991), with a majority appearing in the 1980s 
(Krutz 2001a). Krutz (2001b) finds that using the vehicle of omnibus legislation 
allows for eased passage during times of divided government and tight budgetary 
concerns.  The drawbacks of these attachment practices have also been 
documented, with the most frequent complaint stemming from legislators being 
unacquainted with the details contained within the massive bills (Sinclair 1997; 
Smith 1989).  However, as Hall (1996) documents, only a handful of legislators 
are typically involved in the committee drafting and deliberation of most pieces of 
legislation that move forward in the conventional way as individual, stand-alone 
bills.  Furthermore, in point of fact, in many cases the individual appropriations 
bills that eventually get rolled into an omnibus were subject to separate votes 
when they first passed the House and Senate under the normal order of business. 
                                                 
14 For eighteen of the past thirty-one years (fiscal years 1977 to 2007), Congress condensed two or 
more of the regular appropriations bills into one large measure, or, as with FY2001, the bills were 
partitioned into two minibus bills (Streeter 1997). 
15 Donald Lambro, “Trimming the Fat from the Pork,” Washington Post, 18 December, 2006. 
16 Paul Singer and Tory Newmyer, “Nearly 9,000 Earmark Requests in Omnibus,” Roll Call, 18 
December, 2007. http://www.rollcall.com/issues/53_73/news/21419-1.html (accessed November 
2, 2008). 




Again, we do not disagree with the assessment that omnibus bills include 
wasteful spending or that members may not have time to read over the legislation 
line by line.  However, after examining the evidence, we disagree with the notion 
that omnibus bills bring about extra spending and that there would be 
substantively less pork if Congress passed the appropriations bills under “regular 
order.”  Rather than pointing to instances where dubious projects were included in 
omnibus legislation or simply citing the total amount of pork included in an 
omnibus bill, we look at the data separately for all appropriation bills from 1997 
through 2008. 
In Figure 2, we compare the appropriations bills across years in which 
they were included in an omnibus package with the years when they were passed 
on their own. The size of the box indicates the amount of pork while the shading 
identifies bills that were included in an omnibus package.  Compared to cases in 
which Congress passed individual bills in the conventional fashion, when we look 
at spending bill by bill and over time, the amount of earmarked money depends 
very little on the legislative vehicle.  To see this, compare the size of the shaded 
boxes with the empty boxes for each bill across the years.  For example, in 2002 
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Congress passed each of the bills separately while in 2003 many of the regular 
appropriations bills were included in an omnibus bill.17  If we compare the 
amount of pork in the Transportation Appropriations Bill in 2002 with the amount 
in 2003, there is actually a decline of roughly 17 percent (to about $3.5 billion).  
The same general pattern of little to no positive growth stands if we were to 
compare the amount of pork in the other appropriations bills.  Over the time series 
presented here, only the Energy and Treasury bills included significantly more 
pork when they were included in an omnibus package (p < .05) and one bill, 
Interior, actually had slightly more pork when passed on its own (p < .10).  It 
seems that omnibus bills are laden with pork because they are composed of 
multiple bills, each with a substantial amount of pork.  In fact, the bill with the 
most pork (Defense) rarely ends up in omnibus packages.  Thus, if limiting 
earmarks is the goal, critics would probably be better served by focusing on pork 
advanced in congressional committees long before the appropriations end-game. 
We should be clear to note that direct spending allocated to districts is not 
the only way members of Congress can send pork back to their districts.  
Legislators can also utilize narrowly tailored tax credits to advantage their 
constituents.  These tax breaks can be more valuable than project funding for 
some non-defense corporate interests.18  For example, in the most recent stimulus 
package, legislators evaded President Obama’s call to pass the plan earmark-free 
by artfully crafting the language of tax exemptions and new programs.  Insurance 
tax credit provisions illustrate this—while appearing broad, the credits are only 
for companies employing recreation boats longer than 65 feet, seemingly 
benefiting those working on cruise ships, which happen to comprise a sizeable 
contingent within Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz’s (D–FL) constituency.19  Of 
course, measuring the money lost through tax breaks is much harder compared to 
adding up projects inserted into spending bills.  This is why we focus on spending 
rather than tax breaks in this article.     
 
Airdrops from Conference Committees 
 
The third myth advanced by pundits and advocacy groups is that secretive and 
quick-moving “airdropped” earmarks added at the conference stage compound the 
                                                 
17 As indicated in Figure 2, the jurisdictions of the appropriations subcommittees have been altered 
periodically over the period examined here.  The data reflect earmarks as reported by Citizens 
Against Government Waste transformed to constant 2008 dollars.  Congress failed to pass nine of 
the regular appropriations bills for 2007. 
18 We thank the anonymous reviewers and editors for raising this point. 
19 Michael Grabell and Christopher Weaver. “In the Stimulus Bill: An Earmark by Any Other 
Name,” ProPublica, 5 February, 2009, http://www.propublica.org/feature/welcome-in-the-stimulus 
-bill-an-earmark-by-any-other-name (accessed February 24, 2009). 




problem of pork.  Currently, congressional rules attempt to prohibit the addition 
of new spending in conference committees, but as Rep. Jeff Flake (R–AZ) notes 
“every rule we have can be waived, and we do.”  The problem the media and 
watchdog groups have with airdropping is that the process is seen as “quick and 
secretive” with “virtually no accountability for lawmakers.”  Steve Ellis of 
Taxpayers for Common Sense maintains that “there is not an opportunity to 
scrutinize them because things go like greased lightning.”20  These earmarks, 
stemming from the conference committees’ reconciliation of the House and 
Senate versions of the appropriations bills, have been portrayed by the media as 
adding to the growing amount of pork in the original appropriations bills, often 
times being included only to benefit vulnerable members.21  A major criticism is 
that these types of earmarks are not subject to public comment or legislative 
review through the hearing process.  While the appropriations committees hold 
public hearings and mark-up sessions, the real work in conference committees 
happens behind closed doors.  Despite such strong assertions, we find little 
support for the claim that “airdrops” are the reason for bloated spending bills.   
Figure 3 is a series of pie charts that illustrate earmark dollars by chamber 
for FY1995-2007.22  When broken down by year we see that in only two years 
have conference committees accounted for more that 25 percent of total dollars 
spent on earmarks (FY1995 and FY2006).  On average, 16 percent of total pork 
spending was added in the conference stage.  So, while the dollar amounts vary 
from fiscal year to fiscal year and between the two chambers, the amount of 
earmarks arising from conference deliberation never surpasses the amount coming 
from the appropriations committees.  Because the only way to prohibit such 
earmarks from being attached to the final bill is to vote against the conference 
report, a costly move considering the importance of passing appropriations bills, it 
seems justifiable that members express concern with the use of such “airdropping 
tactics.”  Yet, however reckless the practice, our results suggests it is misguided to 
blame conference committees for the amount of pork barrel spending—the 





                                                 
20 Kristen B. Mitchell, “Earmarks, Quick as a Wink,” The Herald Tribune, 5 October, 2008, 
http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20081005/ARTICLE/810050351 (accessed November 2, 
2008). 
21 Kevin Bogardus, “Earmarks ‘airdropped’ for Freshman,” The Hill, 15 November, 2007, 
http://thehill.com/business--lobby/earmarks-airdropped-for-freshmen-2007-11-15.html  (accessed 
November 2, 2008). 
22 CAGW did not designate chamber of origin for the FY2008 bill. 
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Figure 3 – Percent of Earmarks Dollars by Chamber 
1995 1996 1997 1998
1999 2000 2001 2002
2003 2004 2005 2006
2007 Total
House Senate Conference
Graphs by Fiscal Year
 
The Political Challenges to Earmark Reform 
 
Based on the data reported above—identifying the sources and scope of 
earmarks—we can conclude that earmarks are nowhere near the chief cause of 
problematic budgets and spending practices.  We also show that most earmarks 
are not “airdropped” at the conference stage, but rather they go through the 
normal legislative process.  Nevertheless, there have been continued calls for 
earmark reform by elected officials and budgetary watchdog groups, especially in 
light of recent scandals.  For example, Roy Blunt (R–MO) called for “system-
wide reform” and stated that “…for far too long members have dropped earmarks 
into bills in the dark of night.”23  CAGW also released a report detailing how 
Congress should reform the appropriations process.24  Many of these proposals 
                                                 
23 The Office of the Republican Whip, “Blunt Calls for Democrats to Join Republicans in Earmark 
Reform.” Press release, 29 January, 2008, http://republicanwhip.house.gov/News/Document 
Single.aspx?DocumentID=82809 (accessed October 29, 2008). 
24 Tom Finnigan, “All about Pork: The Abuse of Earmarks and the Need for Reform.” Citizens 
Against Government Waste, 7 March, 2007, http://www.cagw.org/site/PageServer?pagename= 
reports_earmarks (accessed November 2, 2008). 




demanded increased disclosure and mechanisms for lawmakers to eliminate 
earmarks added in conference.  
In 2007, both the House and the Senate succumbed to the pressure and 
passed several new rules governing the procedures of the appropriations process, 
specifically addressing issues such as transparency and earmarks added in 
conference.  In this section, we will detail the new reforms and then show, by 
examining the case of the FY2008 Defense Appropriations Bill, how Congress 
easily worked around the new rules regarding adding earmarks in conference.25  
The House adopted the earmark reforms as part of H.Res. 6, the rules 
package for the 110th Congress, as well as H.Res. 491, while the Senate included 
their reforms in S. 1, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007.  
The new rules in both chambers require a listing of earmarks and their sponsors 
and also detail how a bill can be delayed if the list of earmarks and sponsors is not 
available—basically, by allowing a member to raise a point of order against 
consideration of the legislation or conference report.  The House rules also 
included a specific provision aimed at making it difficult to bypass the new 
reforms by not allowing blanket waivers of points of order in special rules.26 
In terms of conference committees, the House now requires that a listing 
of any new earmarks added in conference be included in the conference report 
and the joint explanatory statement.  The Senate rules on “air drops” appear to be 
stricter since they do not allow the addition of new earmarks to the conference 
report.27  However, and this is why the new rules are essentially meaningless, they 
appear to be silent on including new earmarks as part of the joint explanatory 
statement.  Technically, the conference report contains the text that will reconcile 
the differences between the legislation that passed in the House and Senate while 
the explanatory statement describes the conference report.  The respective 
chambers vote on the conference report, but not the explanatory statement.  As the 
following case will demonstrate, the difference between the two reports allowed 
the Senate to get around its new rules.  
The new rules were tested when Congress decided to move forward with 
the conference proceedings for the FY2008 Defense Appropriations Bill.  The 
agreement reported by the conference committee on November 6, 2007 included 
24 new earmarks worth $59 million (Congressional Record (hereafter, CR) 2007, 
                                                 
25 For even more details about conference reports and the new earmark rules see Schneider (1999), 
Bach (2001), and Rybicki (2007a, b). 
26 Most special rules in the House include a waiver of all points of order.  If a member raises a 
point of order on the special rule for the appropriations bill, then it is resolved with a vote on the 
question of consideration, not the normal ruling from the chair.   
27 The new rules allow a Senator to object to an earmark added in the conference report by raising 
a point of order.  The Senate can then strike the earmark from the report without rejecting the 
entire committee recommendation (by the Presiding Officer sustaining the point of order) but the 
House must then agree to the newly changed conference report. 
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H13312) but listed them in the joint explanatory statement, not in the conference 
report.  On the 7th, the Rules Committee reported a special rule, H.Res. 806, that 
called for consideration of the conference report and included a waiver of all 
points of order against the report and consideration.  This blanket waiver stood in 
clear violation of the new reforms that specifically stated that it is not in order to 
consider a rule that waives the requirement that new earmarks added in 
conference be made public.28  
On the 8th, the House took up H.Res. 806 and Rep. Flake (R–AZ) quickly 
raised a point of order against the rule because it waived all points of order 
against the conference report.  Rep. Slaughter (D–NY), chair of the Committee on 
Rules, defended the rule by arguing that the report properly disclosed all new 
earmarks.  After some debate, the House voted on the question of consideration, 
which passed 220-191 largely along party lines (CR 2007, H13311-13314).  The 
House then moved the previous question and passed the special rule, again with 
party line votes.  Finally, the House voted to pass the conference report with 400 
voting aye and only 15 against.  So, even though the special rule clearly violated 
the new reform, the House easily bypassed it with a simple majority vote.   
Later that same day, the Senate also moved to consider the conference 
report.  However, since the report and not the joint explanatory statement that 
included the new earmarks was under consideration, there was no easy 
parliamentary redress to strip out the newly funded projects.  Senator McCaskill 
(D–MO) summed up the objections to the conference report:    
Unfortunately, I have since discovered there are still some gaps in 
the ethics bill that need to be filled.  One of which has to do with 
the difficulty of raising a 60-vote point of order on earmarks added 
during appropriations conference negotiations.  S.1 says that we 
can do that.  But in reality, we really can’t.  Most of these added 
funding earmarks are contained in the Joint Explanatory Statement 
of Managers, which, technically, isn’t part of the conference report 
bill text.  What that means is we can’t raise a point of order against 
those earmarks to strike them out of the bill (CR 2007, S14147). 
The Senate proceeded to pass the conference report with a voice vote and it 
moved on to the President.   
Thus, it appears that in response to the “problem” of airdrops, the Senate 
passed a solution with no teeth and the new reforms did not have the (publicly-
stated) intended consequences.  The only real outcome of the reforms is a list of 
names attached to the appropriations bills designating who requested the 
earmarks.  It is unlikely that any member will see this as a drawback because most 
                                                 
28 Specifically House Rule XXI, clause 9. 




already proudly report the money they are sending home to their districts in 
newsletters and press releases.  
 
Earmarks for Fiscal Year 2009 
 
In the most recent round of the appropriations process, members of both parties 
continued to include special projects in the individual bills funding government 
operations for FY 2009—$19.6 billion worth of earmarks in all, which represents 
an increase of $2.4 billion over the previous year.  Figure 4 shows the totals for 
each of the separate bills.  Three of the bills—Defense, Homeland Security, and 
Military Construction—passed as separate bills while the others were included in 
 



























Earmarks as reported by Citizens Against Government Waste
Separate Bill Included in Omnibus Package
 
an omnibus appropriations package.29  Similar to previous years, the Defense bill 
included the greatest amount of earmarks dollars followed by Energy and Water, 
Transportation, and Military Construction.  The $11.2 billion in the Defense bill 
                                                 
29 The list of earmarks in the FY2009 bills was not released in time to include in our other 
analyses. 
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represents a massive increase over the $7.3 billion added in fiscal year 2008, and 
although the new earmark reforms require members to claim earmarks, just over 
half of the dollars spent in the Defense bill were not linked with a particular 
member of Congress.  In terms of trends, the dollar amount of earmarks went up 
from last year in five bills (Defense, Financial Services, Interior, Military 
Construction/VA, State/Foreign Operations), decreased in six bills (Agriculture, 
Commerce, Energy and Water, Homeland Security, Legislative Branch, 
Transportation/HUD), and remained the same in one bill (Labor/HHS).  Because 
spending increased in some bills but decreased in others, it is difficult to speculate 
as to whether or not members are succumbing to the pressure to reduce the 
amount of earmarks.     
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Myths propagated by the media, reformers, and outside groups surrounding the 
use of earmarks in the appropriations process paint a very grim picture for fiscal 
responsibility.  Despite the large dollar amounts appropriated and questions 
surrounding the distributive practices under which decisions are made, the 
discourse surrounding earmarks seems to be focusing on the wrong issues.  
Earmarks are not responsible for the burgeoning national debt.  “Airdropped” 
earmarks originating for the first time in conference committees, or pork added in 
omnibus packages, are not the places from which the lion’s share of pork stems.  
To the degree that reform is warranted and practical, critiques of earmarks should 
be redirected to earlier in the budget process, starting with the appropriations 
committees and subcommittees.  It is here, where the bulk of legislating occurs, 
that most earmarks are added to legislation.  While much of the rhetoric regarding 
pork—in terms of its scope and the manner in which it is perpetuated later in the 
legislative process—is misguided, we do agree with the comments by some 
interest groups and members such as Senator Jim DeMint (R–SC) that earmarks 
help to “grease the skids for the passage of bloated spending bills.”30  Members of 
Congress reap electoral rewards for pork, and it is not surprising that they are 
disinclined to vote against measures containing goodies for their district.  
                                                 
30 The Office of Senator Jim DeMint, Issues and Legislation, "Wasteful Spending," Press release, 
http://demint.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Issues.Detail&Issue_id=3e3393d1-7993-
46e4-919f-7c95185c71a8  (accessed October 29, 2008). 
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